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QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether, under Section 61(a) of the Internal Revenue
Code, 26 U.S.C. § 6l(a), a discrimination plaintiffs gross
income from the proceeds of litigation includes the portion
of a damages recovery that is paid to his attorney
pursuant to a contingent fee agreement.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UJ\TITED STATES

No. 03-892
COMMISSIONER OF INTERN.'\L REVENUE, PETITIONER

v.
JOHN W. Bk\iKS, II, RESPONDEr-!

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. la-33a)
is reported at 345 F.3d 373. The opinion of the Tax Court
(Pet. App. 34a-57a) is a memorandum decision, T.C.
Memo. 2001-48 (Feb. 28, 2001), unofficially reported at 81
T.C.M. (CCH) 1219.

JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was filed on
September 30, 2003. The petition for certiorari was filed
on December 19, 2003. This Court has jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
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STATEMENT
L In 1984, Respondent John W. Banks, II, filed a
federal civil rights employment discrimination lawsuit
against his former employer, the California Department
of Education (''CDOE"). Mr. Banks, through his attorney,
filed two amended complaints and a second lawsuit. Mr.
Banks's second amended complaint alleged, inter alia,
violations by the CDOE of: (1) Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; (2) 42
U.S.C. § 1981; and (3) 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pet. App. 2a. The
two lawsuits were consolidated. Shortly after trial began
in 1990, the parties settled all of the claims for $464,000.
Pursuant to a contingent fee contract Mr. Banks entered
into with his attorney before the commencement of the
lawsuit, $150,000 of the settlement amount was retained
by Mr. Banks's attorney. Pet. App. 1a-5a.
2. In 1997, the Commissioner issued a Notice of
Deficiency to Mr. Banks for the 1990 tax year. In the
Notice, the Commissione1· asserted that the portion of the
settlement proceeds retained by Mr. Banks's attorney
under the contingent fee contract also constituted taxable
income to Mr. Banks. Mr. Banks filed a timely petition
with the United States Tax Court challenging the
Commissioner's determination. Pet. App. 6a.
3. The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner's
determination that the portion of the settlement proceeds
retained by 1\:lr. Banks's attorney as a contingent fee also
constituted taxable income to Mr. Banks. Pet. App. 52a.
4. Mr. Banks appealed the Tax Court's decision.
Relying on its previous decision in Estate of Clarl'ls v.
Commissioner, 202 F.3d 854 (6th Cir. 2000), the court of
appeals reversed the Tax Court with respect to the
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contingent fee issue. Pet. App. 17a-25a. 1 In Estate of
Clarks, the court of appeals held that the assignment of
income doctrine does not require that a taxpayer include
in his gross income the attorney's contingent fee portion
of a litigation recovery. Consistent with Estate of Clarhs,
the court of appeals held that the portion of the
settlement retained by Mr. Banks's attorney as a
contingent fee was not income to J\fr. Banks. Pet. App.
25a.

SUMMARYOFARGUMENT
1. This Court has long taught that "[c]ommon
understanding and experience are the touchstones for
interp1·etation of the revenue laws." Helvering v. Horst,
311 U.S. 112, 118 (1940). The Commissioner's position in
this case violates that principle. He asserts that a
contingent fee plaintiff in a federal discrimination case
must include in income not only his net recovery, but the
contingent fee paid to his attorney. ·while conceding that
this rule produces harsh results, the Commissioner
concludes that the assignment of income doctrine, a courtmade anti-abuse rule, requires such a result. However, to
compel the plaintiff to pay taxes on income earned and
enjoyed by his attorney and on which his attorney also
pays taxes contravenes any notion of "common
understanding and experience," and is fundamentally in
conflict with the decisions of this Court that created the
assignment of income doctrine.
2. No provision in the Internal Revenue Code
requires that a federal employment discrimination
plaintiff such as Mr. Banks include in his gross income
1 The court of appeals below also relied upon the Fifth Circuit's
decision in favor of the taxpayer in Srivastava v. Commissioner. 220
F.3d 353 (5th Ci.r. 2000). Pet. App. 23a: accord Foster u, United States.
249 F.3d 1275 (llth Cir. 2001).
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the portion of his settlement earned by, retained by, and
taxed to his attorney as a contingent fee. Section 6l(a)
defines "gross income" as "all income from whatever
source derived." What constitutes "income" for purposes of
Section 61(a) is the subject of a long line of judicial
decisions, many from this Court, none of which support
the Commissioner's position here.
In those cases, the courts have established the
dominion and control test, i.e., that income is charged to a
taxpayer where the taxpayer receives, controls or has
power of disposition over an item of receipt. Prior to
retaining counsel, Mr. Banks, as a practical matter, had
no hope of recovering anything from his speculative claim.
To obtain competent counsel who would share the risk
that the claim would fail, Mr. Banks retained an attorney
by entering into a contingent fee contract. As the court of
appeals below correctly determined, Mr. Banks, by
engaging an attorney to pursue his claims, and by
entering into a contingent fee contract with that attorney,
ceded control over that portion of his recovery. Pet. App.
24a-25a. Mr. Banks's attorney, through his own skill and
effort, made the recovery possible. Mr. Banks had no right
to divest his attorney of the portion of the recovery
rightfully retained by the attorney as a contingent fee.
Thus, under the proper application of the dominion and
control test, that portion of the recovery is not income to
Mr. Banks.
3. The court of appeals below determined, and the
parties do not dispute, that the amount paid by Mr.
Banks's former employer in settlement of his lawsuit was
attributable to Mr. Banks's Title VII federal employment
discrimination claims and his federal civil rights claims
he had plead under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Pet. App. 17a-25a. Amounts received in
settlement of a lawsuit are taxed the same as a successful
judgment would have been taxed. The federal statutes
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under which Mr. Banks brought his claims contained "feeshifting" provisions, under which the federal district court
could have awarded attorney's fees had Mr. Banks
obtained a judgment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988. A portion of the settlement paid by the CDOE to
Mr. Banks was therefore necessarily paid in lieu of any
potential recovery and award for fees under these feeshifting provisions. Because attorney's fees awarded
under the fee-shifting statutes should not give rise to
income for a prevailing plaintiff, Mr. Banks should not be
charged with income on the amounts paid to him and his
attorney by the CDOE to avoid potential liability under
the fee-shifting statutes.

This Court has made clear that Congress' purpose in
enacting fee-shifting statutes was to encourage a litigant
such as Mr. Banks, acting in his capacity as a "private
attorney general," to vindicate public policy with respect
to the federal civil rights or other laws. However, the
Commissioner's position in this case has the effect of
deterring federal civil rights claimants and other federal
and state claimants from bringing meritorious claims.
Even more unsettling about the Commissioner's
position in this case is that it has actually led, in at least
one instance, to a federal employment discrimination
plaintiff owing more in tax than her net recovery in
litigation. Such an absurd and patently unjust result
cannot be accepted, particularly since no provision in the
Internal Revenue Code requires it.
The Commissioner does not confront this issue squareon in his brief, but hints that such a result is mandated
by the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT). Pet. Br. 25. The
AMT disallows certain deductions, such as legal expenses,
in arriving at alternative minimum taxable income. As
applied to a contingent fee contract, however, the AMT,
which operates to allow certain deductions, is a moot
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issue unless it is first determined that the contingent fee
portion of a litigation recovery is gross income to the
plaintiff.
The attorney's portion of a recovery should not be
treated as income. A contingent fee arrangement is the
economic equivalent of a joint venture between the
plaintiff and his attorney. A successful plaintiff thus
should not be charged with the income earned by and
paid to his effective joint venturer, his attorney.
4a. The Commissioner's position that the contingent
fee portion of a litigation recovery is includible in a
plaintiffs gross income rests exclusively on the
misapplication of a court-made anti-abuse rule, i.e., the
assignment of income doctrine. That doctrine has no
application to a contingent fee contract, which is an arm's
length transaction not involving any tax avoidance
purpose. Pet. App. 24a. The assignment of income
doctrine originated as a judicial anti-abuse rule, and was
designed to prevent high bracket taxpayers from shifting
income to lower bracket family members. Two main lines
of assignment of income cases developed, both of which
actually support the taxpayer here.
Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930) is the landmark
case of this Court dealing with the assignment of income
from services. In that case, this Court held that the
taxpayer could not escape the bite of the marginal tax
structure by assigning half of his income to his lower
bracket taxpayer wife. Justice Holmes, writing for this
Court, made it clear that income is properly taxed to the
person who earns it, i.e., under the facts in that case, the
husband. In this case, it is clear that Mr. Banks did not
earn the attorney's fee portion of the settlement; his
attorney did. As a layperson, Mr. Banks's entire
discrimination claim was practically worthless without
his employing the services of a skillful attorney. The price
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he paid for that attorney was, effectively, a portion of that
otherwise worthless claim. The attorney's personal
services converted Mr. Banks's claim into money and Mr.
Banks received the settlement proceeds less the
contingent fee. At no time did Mr. Banks have the ability
to receive or to exe1·cise power of disposition over the
contingent fee. That portion of the settlement was
worthless before retention of counsel and irrevocably
forsaken by Mr. Banks after signing the contingent fee
contract. In sum, Mr. Banks's attoxney, not Mr. Banks,
earned and properly retained the contingent fee.
The second main line of cases dealing with the
assignment of income involves transfers of income from
property. The principle emerging from these cases is
plain: the price that must be paid by the transfe1·or of
income from property in order to effectively assign the
income from property is that he must transfer the income·
producing propexty itself, not just the income. Blair v.
Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937); Helvering v. Horst, 311
U.S. 112 (1940). The taxpayer has done just that in this
case. The income-producing property is Mr. Banks's
discrimination claim. Pursuant to the contingent fee
contract, Mr. Banks, in effect, surrendered the contingent
fee portion of the claim to his attorney. He no longer had
the right to assign it to anyone else or, for that matter,
control its disposition in any way.
Application of the assignment of income doctrine in
Mr. Banks's case is inconsistent with the rationale of the
case law which engendered that doctrine. Mr. Banks's
atto1·ney, not Mr. Banks, earned the contingent fee. 'A1hen
he entered into the contingent fee contract, Mr. Banks
effectively surrendered an undivided interest in his claim,
the income-producing propm-ty. No tax avoidance purpose
was afoot. Under either line of assignment of income
cases, Mr. Banks must prevail and the decision of the
court of appeals below should be affirmed.
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4b. The Commissioner defends his position by relying
on Old Colort)' Trust u. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716, 729
(1929), where this Court held that the satisfaction of a
taxpayer's debt by a payment made by a third party
directly to the taxpayer's creditor is income to the
taxpayer. That case, however, is inapposite here. A
contingent fee plaintiff owes no "debt" to his attorney that
is "discharged" by the defendant.
Cotnam
u.
Commissioner, 263 F.2d 119, 126 (5th Cir. 1959). Instead,
a contingent fee plaintiff, in hope of recovering on his
claim, surrenders a portion of it to his attorney. In the
event the attorney's efforts result in a recovery, through
either judgment or settlement, the attorney receives his
fee from the defendant, and no debtor-creditor
relationship between the attorney and his client ever
arises. If there is no recovery, then the attorney is not
entitled to a fee; a fortiori, no debtor-creditor relationship
exists.
4c. This Court has admonished that double ta.xation is
not to be presumed with respect to a transaction absent a
clear expression of congressional intent to the contrary.
Yet, the Commissioner's position, if followed, results in
double taxation. A contingent fee client and his attorney
will both be taxed on the same item. No provision of the
Internal Revenue Code requires this result. Moreover,
under the classic intra-family assignment of income cases
upon which the Commissioner relies (Earl and Horst), the
only question before the court was which taxpayer was
liable, the high tax bracket assignor, or the lower tax
bracket assignee. Those cases thus do not stand, as the
Commissioner suggests, for the principle that both the
assignor and assignee can be taxed on the same funds.
In sum, this Court created the assignment of income
doctrine to prevent the shifting of income from high
bracket taxpayers to lower bracket taxpayers. It never
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contemplated the misapplication of that doctrine to
produce the results pursued here by the Commissioner.
Moreover, the assignment of income doctrine is a judicial
doctrine, not a constitutional construct, nor a statutory
command of Congress, nor an immutable law. This
doctrine should be applied in such a manner that it
accomplishes its original purpose, and not produce unjust
results, results which undermine other federal laws.

ARGUMENT
I.

NO
PROVISION
OF THE
INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE REQUIRES MR. BANKS TO
RECOGNIZE
INCOME
PROPERLY
ALLOCABLE TO HIS ATTORNEY.

The dispute in this case is over whether the portion of
the settlement in Mr. Banks's federal civil rights lawsuit
against the California Department of Education that was
earned by, retained by, and taxed to Mr. Banks's attorney
as a contingent fee constitutes gross income to Mr. Banks
pursuant to section 61(a) 2 of the Internal Revenue Code.
Importantly, section 61(a) itself does not supply an
answer to this question.
Section 63(a) defines "taxable income'' as "gross
income" less certain enumerated deductions. Section 61(a)
defines "gross income" as "all income from whatever
source derived." Because of the circular and selfl'eferential nature of section 61(a), whether the portion of
Mr. Banks's settlement earned and retained by Mr.
Banks's attorney as a contingent fee is income to Mr.
Banks must be based on a judicial interpretation of the
term "income."
Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986, 26 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., as amended and in effect
during the relevant period.
2
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This Court's decisions have made clear that control or
power of disposition of an item of receipt is a prerequisite
to charging a taxpayer with income. As explained in the
following section, Mr. Banks never had control or power of
disposition over the contingent fee portion of the
settlement.
In addition, as explained in Section III, the
Commissioner's position has the effect of deterring
plaintiffs from prosecuting meritorious claims under Title
VII and other various federal and state laws which
contain fee-shifting provisions. Moreover, as explained in
Section IV, the Commissioner's position leads to
grievously unjust results, such as an employment
discrimination plaintiff actually owing more money in
federal income tax than her net recovery in litigation.
Finally, as explained in Section V, infra, contrary to the
Commissioner's assertions, the assignment of income
doctrine, a judicial anti-abuse rule, does not apply to an
attorney contingent fee contract, which is an arm's length
transaction, akin to a joint venture, not involving any tax
avoidance purpose.
The absence of statutory language indicating that a
successful federal discrimination plaintiff such as l'vh.
Banks must include his attorney's fees in his own income,
combined with the plentiful reasons for not including
those fees in Mr. Banks's income, present a compelling
case for affirming the court of appeals' decision in favor of
Mr. Banks.
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II.

THE PORTION OF THE SETTLEMENT
EARNED BY. RETAINED BY. AND TAXED TO
MR.
BANKS'S
ATTORNEY-THE
CONTINGENT FEE-CANNOT BE INCOME TO
MR. BANKS BECAUSE MR. BANKS LACKED
THE REQUISITE DOMINION, CONTROL. AND
BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP OVER THAT
PORTION OF THE RECOVERY.

In determining what constitutes "income" for purposes
of section 6l(a), this Court has long established that
unfettered control is the hallmark of income:
It is not enough to trace income to the property which
is its true source, a matter which may become more
metaphysical than legaL Nor is the tax problem with
which we are concerned necessarily answered by the
fact that such property, if it can be properly identified,
has been assigned. The cn1cial question remains
whether the assignor retains sufficient power and
control over the assigned property or over receipt of
the income to make it reasonable to treat him as the
recipient of the income for tax purposes.
Commissioner v. Sunnen, 331 U.S. 591, 604 (1948). 3 This
Court has also summarized the control test as follows:
[T]axation is not so much concerned with the
refinements of title as it is with actual command over
the property taxed-the actual benefit for which the
tax is paid. * * * The income that is subject to a man's
unfettered command and that he is free to enjoy at his
own option may be taxed to him as his income,
whether he sees fit to enjoy it or not.

3

As a preliminary matter, it is worth noting that the Commissioner

now agrees with Mr. Banks that federal. not state law conh·ols this
issue. See Pet. Br. 15-18.
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Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376, 378 (1930) (Holmes, J.)
(emphasis added). Put another way, in order to qualify as
"income", the payments received must be "undeniable
accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the
taxpayers have cornplete dominion." Commissioner v.
Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 493 U.S. 203, 209 (1990)
(quoting Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S.
426, 431 (1955)) (emphasis added). The "key" to
determining whether a taxpayer enjoys "complete
dominion" is "whether the taxpayer has some guarantee
he will be allowed to keep the money." Indianapolis Power
& Light Co., 493 U.S. at 210.
The primary authorities relied upon by the
Commissioner actually support the taxpayer in this case.
In Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930), involving the
assignment of income from personal services, the
taxpayer, unlike here, had control over the flow of income,
both before and after the assignment of a portion of that
income to his wife, by regulating the amount of services
he performed. And while the taxpayer lost the ability to
receive a portion of the income after assignment, he had
total control over the income flow at the time of
assignment.
Likewise, in Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940),
involving the assignment of income from property, the
taxpayer, unlike here, had total control over the future
income from interest coupons attached to negotiable
bonds. It is true that, after the taxpayer gave the coupons
to his son, the taxpayer no longer had a right to receive
interest payments. However, after the taxpayer
purchased the bonds, the interest. payments were
virtually certain to be paid. Jd. at 119-20 ("[H]ere the
right of the assignor to receive the income antedated the
assignment which transferred the right."). Thus, it was
the taxpayer's very act of giving the interest coupons
away that constituted the exercise of the power of
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disposition of that income that caused him to realize
income. ld. at 115 ("Here respondent, as owner of the
bonds, had acquixed the legal right to demand payment at
maturity of the interest specified by the coupons and the
power to command its payment to others, which
constituted an economic gain to him.")
The facts in this case are dxamatically different from
the facts in the cases relied on by the Commissioner. By
entering into a contingent fee contract, Mr. Banks ceded
all practical control over the disposition of the contingent
fee portion of any potential future recovery earned by his
attorney. In addition, Mr. Banks never had any de facto
ability to obtain any recovery without the assistance of
counsel. Mr. Banks was not an attorney, and no authority
need be cited for the fact that it is tmlikely that he could
have successfully prosecuted his claims in federal district
court. 4 This is in marked contrast to Horst, supra, where
the bond interest payments that were the subject of the
transfer were virtually certain to be paid out. This also is
in marked contrast to Earl, supra, where it was the
assignor who earned the income that was the subject of
assignment. In a contingent fee arrangement, it is the
assignee-the attorney~whose skill and efforts produce a
recovery from a speculative claim. Estate of Clarlzs u.
United States, 202 F.3d 854, 857 (6th Cir. 2000)
(distinguishing Earl and explaining that, in a contingent
fee arrangement "the lawyer's income is the result of his
own personal skill and judgment, not the skill or largess
of a family member who wants to split his income to avoid
taxation") (emphasis added).
The contingent fee contract Mr. Banks entered into
with his attorney operated to shift practical and legal
A decision in favor of the Commissioner in tlns case will require
many discrimination plaintiffs to do just that in oxder to avoid
incurring a net loss upon a ''successful'' prosecution of their claims.
See Sections III and IV. infra.
4

14
control of the contingent fee portion of the settlement
proceeds from Mr. Banks to his attorney. Under
California law, the assignment to Mr. Banks's attorney
operated as a lien on the contingent fee portion of any
potential recovery. lsrin v. Super. Ct., 403 P.2d 728 (Cal.
1965). Mr. Banks thus did not have uncontrolled
discretion over the portion of the settlement proceeds
earned and rightfully retained by his attorney; he had no
right to divest his attorney of the contingent fee portion of
the settlement proceeds. Accordingly, that portion of the
settlement proceeds cannot be income to Mr. Banks.

Cotnarn v. Commissioner, 263 F.2d 119 (5th Cir.
1959), was the first case to address the applicability of the
assignment of income doctrine to attorney contingent fee
contracts. The Fifth Circuit in that case concluded that,
unlike the typical assignment of income situation, such as
Earl, supra, where the assignor needs only to perform
services to generate the income to be transferred, a
plaintiff in a contingent fee situation, as a practical
matter, can obtain a judgment or settlement only by
ceding control of a portion of any potential recovery to his
attorney:
[The contingent fee plaintiffs] claim had no faiT
market value, and it was doubtful and uncertain as to
whether it had any value. The only economic benefit
she could then derive from her claim was to use a part
of it in helping her to collect the remainder.
Accordingly she, in effect, assigned to her attorneys
forty per cent of the claim in order that she might
collect the remaining sixty per cent. That was not the
assignment of income of Mrs. Cotnam within the
doctrine of Lucas v. Earl.

Id. at 125.
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Similarly, the Sixth Circuit also considered the
contingent fee plaintiffs lack of effective control over the
fee portion of a settlement or judgment to be significant
and likened the contingent fee arrangement to a joint
venture. The Sixth Circuit concluded that a contingent fee
arrangement is akin to a joint venture, correctly
determining that only the attorney should include the fee
in income. Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d at 857; see also Pet.
App. 24a (stating "taxpayer's claim was like a partnership
or joint venture in which the taxpayer assigned away onethird in hope of recovering two-thirds"). The Sixth
Circuit's analysis is supported by the Internal Revenue
Code. Sections 761(a) and 7701(a)(2) both provide that the
term "partnership" includes, inter alia, a joint venture
through or by means of which any business, financial
operation, or venture is carried on. ''The tax definition of a
'partnership' is broad and imprecise, embracing every
jointly owned, profit-oriented arrangement that is not a
corporation, trust, or estate, whether or not the
arrangement constitutes a state law partnership."
William S. McKee, et al., FEDERAL TAXATION OF
PARTNERSHIPS & PARTNERS, vol. 1, , 3.02 (3d ed.,
Warren, Gorham & Lamont of RIA, 1997 & Supp. 2004)
[citing sections 761(a) and 7701(a)(2)].
The Sixth Circuit's holdings are consistent with the
statutory provisions governing the taxation of partners.
Section 6l(a)(13) provides that gross income includes an
individual's distributive share of partnership gross
income. Section 704(a) provides, in general, that a
partner's distributive share of income shall be determined
by the partnership agreement subject to the requirement
in section 704(b) that the agreement has substantial
economic effect. The contingent fee agreement between
Mr. Banks and his attorney reflected the economic reality
that Mr. Banks's claim was not recoverable without a
skilled attorney who would expend substantial efforts,

16

and incur the risk that his
unremunerated if the claim failed.

efforts

would

go

Indeed, the economic substance of a contingent fee
arrangement has all the essential elements of a joint
venture. First, the client contributes the inchoate claim,
and under the contingent fee arrangement, the attorney,
through his skill and effort, adds value to the asset (i.e.,
by prosecuting the lawsuit). Second, it is the attorney and
attorney alone who earns the contingent fee portion of
any recovery. This is in fundamental contrast to Earl,
supra, where it was the assignor, not the assignee, who
earned the income subject to assignment. Third, the
attorney incurs a substantial risk in the venture, namely,
that, absent recovery, he will not be paid. Fourth, the
attorney has a bona fide property interest in the
contingent fee portion of the recovery. Neither the
plaintiff, nor anyone else, has a right to divest the
attorney of the portion of the recovery earned and
retained as a contingent fee. The attorney, in effect, has a
right to exclude others from that portion of the recovery,
and it is that very right to exclude which this Court has
recognized is the hallmark of a property interest. College
Savings Bani?- v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Education Krpense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 673 (1999) (stating
"The hallmark of a protected property interest is the right
to exclude others. That is 'one of the most essential sticks
in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized
as property."') (quoting Kaiser ~4etna v. United States, 444
U.S. 164, 176 (1979)).
In sum, the relationship between Mr. Banks and his
attorney was effectively that of joint venturers. Like joint
venturers, each should be taxed only on the amount he
received.
The Commissioner contends that a plaintiff who
pledges a portion of a potential recovery to his attorney as
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a contingent fee still has sufficient control to be charged
with income on that portion because he retains the right
to dismiss the lawsuit and to authorize settlement. Pet.
Br. 32. This argument misses the point. The critical
question is not whether a contingent fee plaintiff like M1·.
Banks transferred title to all of his rights as a plaintiff to
his attorney. Rather, the critical question is whether Mr.
Banks had "complete dominion" (Glenshaw Glass, 348
U.S. at 431) or "unfettered command" (Corliss, 281 U.S. at
378) over the assigned property. It is plain that he did
not. Hypothetically, Mr. Banks could have obstreperously
refused to accept his attorney's recommendation to settle,
thereby preventing (at least temporarily) his attorney
from receiving his contingent fee. At no time, however,
was Mr. Banks in a position to receive the fee himself or
direct that it be paid to anyone else.
Mr. Banks cannot be charged with income from an
item that he neithe1· received nor could have received.
Commissioner v. First Securit;y Banlz of Utah, 405 U.S.
394, 403 (1972) ("We know of no decision of this Court
wherein a person has been found to have taxable income
that he did not receive and that he was prohibited from
receiving. * * * The underlying assumption always has
been that in orde1· to be taxed for income, a taxpayer must
have complete dominion over it.") (emphasis added). By
entering into the contingent fee contract with his
attorney, Mr. Banks ceded substantial control over his
lawsuit, and all control over the portion attributable to
the contingent fee earned and retained by his attorney.
Accm·dingly, under this Court's precedents, Mr. Banks
lacked the necessary dominion and control over the
contingent fee portion of the settlement, both before and
after entering into the contingent fee contract, to be
charged with income on that portion.
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III. THE ATTORNEY'S FEES PORTION OF THE
SETTLEMENT WAS IN LIEU OF AMOUNTS
THAT COULD HAVE BEEN AWARDED
UNDER FEE-SHIFTING STATUTES AND IS
THEREFORE INCOME ONLY TO MR.
BANKS'S ATTORNEY.
Amounts received in settlement of a legal claim are
taxed the same as a judgment under that claim would
have been taxed. The question is "in lieu of what'' was the
settlement paid. Bagley v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 396,
406 (1995), aff'd, 121 F.3d 393 (8th Cir. 1997); see also
Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572, 578 (1970);
United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39, 48 (1963); Treas.
Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (section 104(a)(2) exclusion for amounts
received on account of personal injuries or sickness
applies to amounts received through a settlement
agreement entered into in lieu of such prosecution).
The court of appeals below determined that the
settlement received by Mr. Banks and his attorney was in
lieu of claims under (1) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; (2) 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981; and (3) 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pet. App. 2a-3a, 10a-17a.
This holding has not been challenged by the parties.
Accordingly, the taxation of the settlement payment
received by Mr. Banks and his attorney is controlled by
the tax treatment of recoveries under those statutes.
Each of the statutes under which Mr. Banks could
have recovered contains a "fee-shifting" provision which
enables a court to award attorneys fees to those who
successfully prosecute claims. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k),
42 U.S.C. § 1988. A portion of the settlement paid to Mr.
Banks and his attorney was therefore necessarily paid in
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lieu of any potential recovery under those fee-shifting
statutes.5
An amount awarded by a court under a fee-shifting
,statute is properly income only to the attorney who
receives the awarded fees from the defendant. Cf. Porter
v. United States Agency for Int'l Dev., 293 F. Supp. 2d 152
(D.D.C. 2003). The court-awarded attorney's fees are
separate and distinct from any award intended to
compensate the prevailing plaintiff. The fee-shifting
statutes simply put the burden of some of the costs of
litigation on the defendant by requiring the defendant to
pay the plaintiff's attorney's reasonable fees. The
defendant's payment to the plaintiffs attorney does not
represent an accession to the plaintiff's wealth, and
should not be treated as income to the plaintiff under
section 6l(a).

As a civil rights plaintiff, Mr. Banks was acting as a
"private attorney general,'' vindicating public policy, when
he pursued his claims against the CDOE. See Newman v.
Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968).
Congress chose to encourage suits like Mr. Banks's by
enacting fee-shifting statutes under which a court could
require the CDOE to pay Mr. Banks's attorney's
reasonable fees. See Venegas v. Mitchell, 495 U.S. 82, 86
(1990). Partly to eliminate the possibility of a court
requiring it to pay Mr. Banks's attorney, the CDOE
settled the case.

;; There is no reason that a litigant who opts to settle his case. such as
Mr. Banks, and whose attorney is paid pursuant to a contingent fee
contract, should be treated any differently for tax purposes than a
litigant who recovers atto1·ney's fees pursuant to a federal fee-shifting
statute. Such a position, if adopted by this Court, would contravene
previous decisions of this Court recognizing that Congress intended to
encourage settlement of employment discrimination disputes.
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998); EEOC
v. Shell Oil, Inc .. 466 U.S. 54, 57 (1984).
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The approach advocated by the Commissioner in this
case would punish civil rights litigants who answer
Congress's call and assume the role of "private attorneys
general." Charging Mr. Banks with income on the portion
of the settlement attributable to CDOE's extinguishment
of its potential obligation to pay Mr. Banks's attorney
undermines the civil rights statutes. 6 Mr. Banks should
properly only recognize income on the portion of the
settlement that he actually received and of which he
enjoyed the economic benefit.

IV. THE COMMISSIONER'S POSITION LEADS TO
ABSURD
AND
GRIEVOUSLY
UNJUST
RESULTS,
AND
HAS
CAUSED
A
CONTINGENT FEE PLAINTIFF TO OWE
MORE IN TAX THAN HER ENTIRE NET
RECOVERY.
As explained above, the Commissioner's position in
this case is neither supported by any provision of the
Internal Revenue Code, nor by any of the cases of this
Court interpreting the term "income" for purposes of
6 Mr. Banks's contingent fee contract was controlled by California law.
A decision in favor of the Commissioner by this Court would have the
consequence of undermining the California Supreme Court's
determination that attorney's fees awarded pursuant to a California
fee-shifting provision. Cal. Gov't Code § 12965 (part of the California
Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Cal. Gov't Code § 12900 et
seq.). belong exclusively to a FEHA claimant's attorney, absent an
enforceable contract to the contrary. See Flannery v. Prentice. 28 P.3d
860 (Cal. 2001). Under Flannery. there is no basis for contending that
a FEHA claimant has any control. for federal tax purposes. over an
attorney's fee awarded pursuant to the FEHA fee-shifting statute to be
charged with federal income tax. Such claimants should not be charged
with federal income tax on those amounts that they do not control.
However, should the Court rule against Mr. Banks in this case, it
would have collateral consequences for FEHA claimants pursuing their
discrimination claims under state law. FEHA claimants. due to federal
income tax considerations, would have less incentive to settle their
state claims.
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section 61(a). But perhaps most striking of all about the
Commissioner's position, which is based entirely on a
judicial anti-abuse rule, is the harsh and absurd results it
foists upon certain federal and state litigants in
discrimination and other actions. There is no reason to
accept these results, especially in light of the fact that
they are not compelled by any provision in the text of the
Internal Revenue Code.

As chronicled in the New York Times, Cynthia Spina,
a law enforcement officer employed by the Forest
Preserve District of Cook County, Illinois, sued her
employer for sex discrimination and harassment. Adam
Liptak, "Tax Bill Exceeds Award to Officer in Sex Bias
Suit," NEW YORK TIMEs, August 11, 2002, at section 1,
column 5, p. 18; see also Spina u. Forest Preserve District
of Cook County, 207 F. Supp. 2d 764 (N.D. Ill. 2002). Ms.
Spina recovered an award of $300,000, in addition to
about $850,000 in attorney's fees and $100,000 in costs.
Mter all was said and done, Ms. Spina's tax bill consumed
her entire $300,000 recovery, and she actually wound up
owing the Commissioner $99,000.
In his carefully-reasoned and lengthy (38-page)
dissent in Kenseth v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 399, 421-58
(2000), Judge Beghe, inter alia, forewarned that the
Commissioner's untenable position would lead to the
absurd result in Ms. Spina's case: "[I]n cases in which the
aggregate fees exceed 72-73 percent of the recovery, the
tax can exceed the net recovery, resulting in an overall
effective rate of tax that exceeds 100 percent of the net
recovery." Id. at 425-26. Such a result, however, can occur
only if, as a threshold matter, it is determined that the
attorney's fee portion of Ms. Spina's award is "income" to
her under section 6l(a). Once that determination is
reached, the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) provisions
of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. §§ 55-59, operate
to disallow her any deduction of her attorney's fees.
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The Commissioner cannot seriously maintain that the
result in Ms. Spina's case is merely the unfortunate result
of a mechanical application of the tax laws enacted by
Congress, specifically the AMT. Nothing in the text of the
Internal Revenue Code mandates the result in Ms.
Spina's case. The AMT, inter alia, operates to impose a
statutory limit or bar on certain types of deductions
claimed by a taxpayer. Application of the AMT provisions,
however, is a moot issue unless it is initially determined
that the attorney's fee portion of her recovery is gross
income to her under section 61(a). As explained more fully
in Section V, infra, the Commissioner bases his
determination that the attorney's fee portion of a recovery
is includible in a plaintiffs gross income entirely on the
assignment of income doctrine-a court-made anti-abuse
rule. The result in Ms. Spina's case thus rests entirely on
the erroneous application of a judicial doctrine. This is
why Mr. Banks plainly is not asking this Court to
disregard, for equitable reasons, any of the statutory
requirements or computational steps mandated by the
AMT.
The Commissioner's position ultimately has the
chilling effect of discouraging federal civil rights plaintiffs
from bringing meritorious claims. The assignment of
income doctrine, a court-created anti-abuse rule, should
not be used to reach such results. It is revealing that the
Commissioner's brief does not address the manifestly
unjust results in cases such as Ms. Spina's, results
compelled by the Commissioner's position in this case.
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V.

THE ASSIGNMENT OF INCOME DOCTRINE
IS A COURT-CREATED ANTI-ABUSE RULE
THAT DOES NOT APPLY TO AN ATTORNEY
CONTINGENT FEE CONTRACT.
A.

A
Contingent
Fee
Contract
Is
Fundamentally Distinguisbable From The
Classic Intra-Family Assignments Of
Income Present in Such Cases As Earl
And Horst.

The Commissioner does not identify any provision of
the Internal Revenue Code that expressly provides that a
discrimination claimant like Mr. Banks must include in
his gross income the portion of the recovery earned and
retained by his attorney as a contingent fee. Instead, the
Commissioner relies exclusively upon a judicially-created
anti-abuse rule known as the assignment of income
doctrine.
Because the federal income tax is progressive,
taxpayers have sometimes attempted to shift income to
lower bracket taxpayers. Section 61 defmes income but,
notably, does not indicate how to determine who is the
appropriate taxpayer. Nevertheless, the courts, and, in
particular, this Court, have filled the breach by adopting
certain principles to determine who should report an item
of income that is transferred from one taxpayer to
another. The term "assignment of income doctrine" was
the label affixed to these principles.
In this case, the Commissioner has turned the
assignment of income doctrine inside-out by asserting
that it requires Mr. Banks to report his attorney's
contingent fee as income of his own. The assignment of
income doctrine originated in cases such as Lucas v. Earl,
281 U.S. 111 (1930), and Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112
(1940), and has developed as a judicial anti-abuse rule
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designed to prevent high bracket taxpayers from shifting
income to lower bracket family members to avoid paying
income tax at a higher marginal rate. See United States v.
Basye, 410 U.S. 441, 450 (1973) (stating "[t]he principle of
Lucas v. Earl, that he who earns income may not avoid
taxation through anticipatory arrangements no matter
how clever or subtle, has been repeatedly invoked by this
Court and stands today as a cornerstone of our graduated
income tax system").
A contingent fee contract, however, is an arm's length
transaction not involving any tax avoidance purpose. The
assignment of income doctrine thus does not apply to such
an arrangement. Pet. App. 24a; Estate of Clarhs, supra,
202 F.3d at 857; Cotnarn, supra, 263 F.2d at 126. There is
no reason to apply this anti-abuse rule to tax Mr. Banks
on income earned by the skill and efforts of his attorney,
that Mr. Banks never received, and which Mr. Banks
never was legally entitled to receive.
Two main lines of assignment of income cases have
developed, one dealing with the assignment of income
from services and the other with the assignment of
income from property. Under either line of cases, Mr.
Banks should prevail. With respect to the assignment of
income from services, this Court held in Earl, supra, that
a taxpayer could not escape the bite of the progressive tax
structure by splitting income he earned with his lower
income bracket wife. Writing for the Court, Justice
Holmes explained that a taxpayer could not avoid
taxation through such clever diversions:
[T]he tax could not be escaped by anticipatory
arrangements and contracts however skilfully devised
to prevent the salary when paid from vesting even for
a second in the man who earned it. That seems to us
the import of the statute before us and we think that
no distinction can be taken according to the motives
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leading to the arrangement by which the fruits are
attributed to a different tree from that on which they
grew.
281 U.S. at 115 (emphasis added). 7 The fundamental
principle from Earl is clear: income is taxed to the person
who earns it. The facts of this case are equally clear: Mr.
Banks's attorney earned the contingent fee and the
income from that portion of the recovery is Mr. Banks's
attorney's alone to report. Pet. App. 22a ("unlike the Earl
* * * assignee[] who performed no services to earn [her]
income, the attorney earned his income because the
income resulted from his own skill and judgment''); Estate
of Clarks, 202 F.3d at 858 (''The income should be charged
to the one who earned it and received it, not as under the
government's theory of the case, to one who neither
received it nor earned it'').
In sum, if this case is viewed as an attempted
assignment of income from services, then the taxpayer
must prevail. Mr. Banks performed no services to earn
the contingent fee. Those services were provided solely by
his attorney.
This Court has also held that income from property
can be effectively assigned for federal income tax
purposes but only at a price: control of the income·
producing property must be relinquished as well. Blair v.
Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937). In Horst, supra, a
taxpayer attempted to avoid paying income tax on
interest earned from negotiable bonds by assigning the
detachable periodic interest coupons as a gift to his son
7 It may be true, as the Commissioner contends (Pet. Br. 33-34), that
since the contl·act between Mr. Ea1•l and his wife antedated the advent
of the federal income tax, no tax avoidance motive was afoot. However.
Mr. Earfs assignment had the effect of tax avoidance because of the
progressivity of the income tax. As explained in detail in Section V(B).
infra, the assignment of income doctrine is widely understood as a
judicial anti-abuse rule.
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prior to their maturity date. The Court rejected the
taxpayer's reliance on Blair because Mr. Horst, unlike
Mr. Blair, had retained ownership over the incomeproducing property (the bonds). 311 U.S. at 118-119.
If this case is to be viewed as an assignment of income
from property, what is the property? It would have to be
Mr. Banks's discrimination claim against his employer.
By entering into the contingent fee contract, Mr. Banks
effectively transferred an undivided interest in the
attorney's fees portion of the income-producing property.
Under Blair, the income from that property is charged to
the transferee, his attorney. 300 U.S. at 12; see also,
Daniel Q. Posin, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
INDIVIDUALS , 5.02 at 340 (5th ed., West 2000)
(explaining that, in Blair, ''The father, in effect, chopped
down some of his fruit and some of his tree and gave some
of his fruit and some of his tree to his children. Such a
'vertical cut' was effective to shift the tax liability on the
assigned income to the children.") (emphasis in original).

A contingent fee arrangement thus differs
significantly from the transactions considet·ed in the
classic assignment of income cases. Unlike the situations
in Earl and Horst, the value of the contingent fee portion
of the claim assigned by Mr. Banks was (1) speculative
and unaccrued at the time of transfer, {2) entirely
dependent upon the efforts and skill of the assignee
rather than the assignor, and (3) motivated by practical,
non-tax considerations, not tax avoidance. These factors
influenced the Sixth Circuit's decision to refuse to apply
the assignment of income doctrine. Estate of Clarks, 202
F.3d at 857.
In Earl, this Court employed a tree-fruit metaphor to
explain why a taxpayer could not shift income from
services to his lower bracket wife: "no distinction can be
made according to the arrangement by which fruits are
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attributed to a different tree on which they grew." 281
U.S. at 115. The tree-fruit metaphor simply provides
another way of stating that income must be attributed to
the person who earns it. In Earl it was the husband (the
tree) who earned the income (the fruit), and he could not
escape taxation by assigning the fruit to his wife.
The tree-fruit metaphor is more descriptive of the
circumstances where the assignment is one of property. A
rental building (tree) generates rent (fruit); corporate
stock (tree) generates dividends (fruit); and, as in Horst, a
bond (tree) generates interest income (fruit). As noted
earlier, the income (fruit) from income-producing property
(tree) can be effectively transferred for federal income tax
purposes if the transferor is willing to transfer the tree
along with the fruit. Here, Mr. Banks effectively
transferred an undivided interest in his discrimination
claim (tree). Pet. App. 24a-25a ("[b]y signing the
contingency fee agreement, [Mr. Banks] transferred some
of the trees from the orchard, rather than simply
transferring some of the orchard's fruit.") (citing Estate of
Clarks, 202 F.3d at 858); accord Cotnam, supra, 263 F.2d
at 126. As a result, the contingent fee (fruit) is solely the
income ofMr. Banks's attorney.
In sum, the Commissioner's position in this case is at
odds with the rationale of the relevant case law
establishing the assignment of income doctrine. Mr.
Banks's attorney, not Mr. Banks, earned the contingent
fee. When he entered into the contingent fee contract, Mr.
Banks effectively surrendered an undivided interest in his
claim, the income-producing property. At the time of
transfer, Mr. Banks's claims were speculative and
unaccrued, and could be turned into recovery only
through the effort of a skilled attorney. No tax avoidance
purpose was afoot. Accordingly, the contingent fee portion
of Mr. Banks's settlement is not income to him.
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B.

The Assignment Of Income Doctrine Is A
Judicial Anti-Abuse Rule And Should Not
Be Applied Here Because Mr. Banks•s
Motivation For Signing The Contingent
Fee Contract Was Not To Avoid Taxes.

The Commissioner contends that the judicial
assignment of income doctrine is not an anti-abuse rule.
Pet. Br. 33-34. The Commissioner rests his assertion in
part on the fact that in Earl, the husband and wife
entered into the contract to split income prior to the
advent of the federal income tax. Pet. Br. 33. While Mr.
Earl himself might not have had a tax avoidance motive
at the time he entered into the agreement, his assignment
certainly resulted in tax avoidance after the
establishment of the income tax. The facts in that case
constitute the quintessential tax avoidance situation for
post-income tax agreements and this Court treated it as
such: "There is no doubt that the statute could tax
salaries to those who earned them and provide that the
tax could not be escaped by anticipatory arrangements
and contracts however skilfully devised to prevent the
salary when paid from vesting even for a second in the
man who earned it." 281 U.S. at 114 (emphasis added). In
addition, the failure to rescind the agreement after the
imposition of the income tax must have been motivated in
whole or in part by tax avoidance.
The assignment of income doctrine developed as, and
is universally understood to be, a judicial doctrine crafted
for the purpose of preventing taxpayers from planning
ploys designed to defeat the progressive tax system. See
Daniel Q. Posin, FEDERAL INCOME TA..XATION OF
INDIVIDUALS~ 5.02 (5th ed., West 2000); see also Lehman
v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 629, 633 (1955) ("The
anticipatory assignment of income doctrine presupposes
the ability of the assignor to earn the income at issue and
an intent to escape the tax burden thereon by transferring
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the right to such mcome pnor to its actual receipt.")
(emphasis added).
This Court, in a very early assignment of income case,
Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937), expressly
considered whether a ta.x avoidance purpose was afoot in
determining not to apply the assignment of income
doctrine. In that case, this Court ruled that the
assignment by a father to his children of fixed annual
dollar amounts of income to be paid from the life interest
in a trust was effective for tax purposes. In so ruling, this
Court noted that "[t]here is here no question of evasion or
of giving effect to statutory provisions designed to
forestall evasion." Id. at 12. In addition, this Court has
explained further in another case, many years later, that:
The principle of Lucas u. Earl, that he who earns
income may not avoid ta;mtion through anticipatory
arrangements no matter how clever or subtle, has been
repeatedly invoked by this Comt and stands today as
a corne1·stone of our graduated income tax system.

Basye, supra, 410 U.S. at 450 (emphasis added).
The Commissioner's assertion that the presence or
absence of a tax avoidance purpose is not relevant is also
inconsistent with his position taken in a recent private
letter ruling. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200427009 (July 2, 2004)
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(available at 2004 PRL LEXIS 342). 8 There, the
Commissioner, citing, inter alia, Cold Metal Process Co. v.
Commissioner, 247 F.2d 864 (6th Cir. 1957), and Jones v.
Commissioner, 306 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1962), determined
that where a taxpayer transfers a portion of a claim in
litigation to a third party prior to the expiration of
appeals, the taxpayer is "not required to include the
proceeds of the judgment in income under the assignment
of income doctrine." 2004 PRL LEXIS 342, at *11. The
Commissioner based his ruling in part on the fact that the
taxpayer's assignments in question "appear[ed] to have
been motivated by genuine business purposes." 2004 PRL
LEXIS 342, at **10, 12 (citing Jones, supra). The facts
here are slightly different, but the principles cited by the
Commissioner have general applicability. As the
Commissioner recognized in his own ruling, the
taxpayer's motivation is a significant factor in
determining whether a transfer is an assignment of
income. His position to the contrary in this case is
incorrect.

s The private letter ruling is cited for the limited purpose of
demonstrating the Commissioner's inconsistent position. not as
precedent. See 26 U.S.C. § 6110(k)(3); see also Hanover Bank v.
Commissioner, 369 U.S. 672, 686 (1962) (stating "[A]lthough the
petitioners are not entitled to rely upon unpublished private rulings
which were not issued specifically to them, such rulings do reveal the
interpretation put upon the statute by the agency charged with the
responsibility of administering the revenue laws.'): see also Harco
Holdings, Inc. v. United States. 977 F.2d 1027, 1035 n.13 (7th Cir.
1992) (citing private letter ruling as evidence of erroneous or
inconsistent IRS position). In addition, the private letter ruling is a
valuable resource to the extent of the strength of Commissioner"s
analysis therein and the cases relied on by the Commissioner.

